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Rust v. Sullivan: Redirecting the Katzenbach v.
Morgan Power
Paul Chuey*
In Rust v. Sullivan,1 the United States Supreme Court
upheld a Department of Health and Human Services regula-
tion,2 which forbids employees of federally funded family plan-
ning clinics from discussing abortion with their clients.' Rust's
holding, however, conflicts with previous First Amendment
doctrine involving content-based conditions on government
subsidy and employment.4 The Rust Court could have reached
this decision in one of two ways: the Court could have consid-
ered the constitutionality of the regulation, or the Court could
have found that the decision on constitutionality was not its to
make. The former approach is often labeled "theoretical,"
while the latter is labeled "metatheoretical. '5
* B.M. 1983, Arizona State University; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Puget
Sound School of Law.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
2. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1992).
3. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
4. The regulation conditioned receipt of a government subsidy on speech content
without requiring the government to show a compelling state interest. See discussion
infra part III.
5. In a purely theoretical decision, the Court does not question its own role in
deciding the constitutional issue. An example of this is Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (holding imprisonment for potentially offensive word printed on jacket
unconstitutional). In a purely metatheoretical decision, the Court does not reach the
"merits," but decides not to hear the case. An example of this is Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984) (holding that parents of black school children lack standing to contest
federal tax deductions to schools that discriminate on the basis of race).
Metatheoretical decisions are often couched in terms of "judicial restraint." Many
constitutional decisions combine theoretical and metatheoretical aspects. An example
of this is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding state law crmnizig abortion an
unconstitutional interference with the right to privacy). Many commentators
recognize this distinction, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories:
A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 40 Otuo ST. L.J. 3 (1981), although not
always using these terms. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
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On the surface, the Rust Court appears to rule on the con-
stitutionality of the regulation, applying theoretical First
Amendment doctrine. This Note, however, proposes that the
Rust Court decided that the constitutional decision was not its
to make. This decision has critical metatheoretical implica-
tions because it does not merely involve speech protection in
the federally funded workplace; rather, it allows the federal
courts to defer to an administrative agency's constitutional
interpretation.' Such deference, in turn, shifts power from the
judiciary to the executive branch.
By deferring to the discretion of another branch of the
federal government on a question of constitutional interpreta-
tion, the Rust Court implicitly resurrects and reshapes the long
ignored doctrine of Katzenbach v. Morgan.7 Despite their dif-
ferent substantive issues, these two cases have a similar effect
on the federal judiciary's role in constitutional interpretation.
Section I of this Note describes the facts and history surround-
ing Rust and Morgan. Section II examines the Rust doctrine of
judicial deference in the context of Morgan. Section III exam-
ines the Rust Court's approach to the First Amendment issues
raised by the regulation in question. Finally, Section IV
explores Rust's possible implications.
I. A COMPARISON OF MORGAN AND RUST
The facts and history of Morgan and Rust must be
examined before comparing the Court's metatheoretical
approaches in those cases. In Morgan, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a state law requiring citizens to pass a liter-
acy test before being allowed to vote.' Previously, Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections9 controlled this issue.
In upholding literacy tests, the Lassiter Court found that "[t]he
ability to read and write .. .has some relation to standards
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213-15 (1978);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF PoLITIcs 3 (1962) (describing this distinction in the context of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). This Note uses these terms because no other
terms that describe this distinction have been widely accepted.
6. This Note uses the phrase "constitutional interpretation" to refer to any act of a
governmental body, intentional or otherwise, that potentially alters constitutional
doctrine.
7. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
8. Id. at 643.
9. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." 10
Consistent with Lassiter, the state of New York required
its citizens to pass an English literacy test before voting.'1
After the Lassiter decision and the passage of the New York
law, however, the United States Congress passed Section 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,12 prohibiting "the States from
conditioning the right to vote of [U.S. citizens educated in
Spanish in Puerto Rico] on ability to read, write, understand,
or interpret any matter in the English language."'"
The plaintiffs in Morgan, registered New York voters,
challenged the constitutionality of Section 4(e) to the extent
that it prohibited the enforcement of the election laws of New
York.14 The issue was whether Congress could invalidate the
New York law under its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5
power if, under Lassiter,5 the New York law did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 6 The
Morgan Court distinguished Lassiter, neither criticizing it nor
overruling it.17
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Morgan set out two
rationales for upholding Section 4(e). i s First, Congress may
select means to remedy discrimination under the McCulloch v.
Maryland19 Section 5 standard.20 Second, Congress may apply
its superior legislative fact-finding competence to invalidate a
state law that invidiously discriminates, even if, apparently,
that law has been held constitutional by the Court.2 ' The sec-
ond rationale allows Congress to define for itself the constitu-
tional provisions that it may enforce under Section 5.22 Thus,
10. Id. at 51.
11. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 150 (Consol. 1949).
12. 42 U.S.C. 1973b(e)(1) (1964).
13. Id.
14. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643-44.
15. See Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of
the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299, 302 (1982).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. "[O]ur decision in Lassiter ... is inapposite." Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649.
18. Id. at 650-58.
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
20. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51. The McCulloch v. Maryland standard provides as
follows: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
21. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656 n.17. For an explanation of the difference between the
two rationales in Morgan, see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
22. Choper, supra note 15, at 303.
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Morgan placed in the hands of Congress the power to interpret
the Constitution and the power to make legislation according
to that interpretation.
Rust arose from a controversy very different from that in
Morgan. In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public
Health Service Act.23 The Act authorized the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to make grants to
healthcare organizations "to assist in the establishment and
operation of voluntary family planning projects... "24 Section
1008 of the Act specifies that "[n]one of the funds appropriated
under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abor-
tion is a method of family planning."' Until 1988, the Depart-
ment interpreted Section 1008 as allowing unrestricted
counseling and referral for abortion to encourage coordination
with existing local and state family planning services.2 6
In 1988, the Secretary promulgated 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-
2924, 7 which required that a "Title X project may not provide
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of fam-
ily planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of
family planning. ,,"2 The regulations forbid a clinic
employee from referring a client to an abortion provider, even
upon request, but allow the employee to respond, "the project
does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family
planning .... "
A group of Title X grantees and doctors sued the Secre-
tary on behalf of themselves and their patients, challenging the
facial validity of the regulation and seeking injunctive relief.30
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Secretary,31 and the Second Circuit affirmed.32 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a five-to-four majority, relied on the
agency's rule-making competence3 and affirmed the Second
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-41 (as amended 1988).
24. Id. § 300a.
25. Id. § 300a-6.
26. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1768-69.
27. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
28. Id
29. Id. § 59.8(b)(5).
30. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766.
31. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), qff'd without
opinion, 863 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989).
32. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).




The Supreme Court's analysis employed two steps. First,
the Court held that the regulation is a permissible interpreta-
tion of Section 1008.1 Second, the Court determined that the
regulation is consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments
of the Constitution.' The first step required the application of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., which states that when a statute is ambiguous and does
not speak to the issue at hand, "the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."'  The second step required an analy-
sis of the First Amendment doctrines set out in several cases,
including Rankin v. McPherson'9 and Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject, Inc. v. Ragland.'
Although Morgan and Rust dealt with different substan-
tive constitutional doctrines, certain procedural similarities
between the two cases are immediately apparent. Both cases
focused on a fundamental right and started with an apparently
settled constitutional doctrine: Morgan raised the voting rights
doctrine from Lassiter, while Rust implicated the First Amend-
ment doctrines set out in Rankin and Arkansas Writers'. In
both, a rule or policy existed in harmony with the apparently
settled doctrine: a New York voting statute allowing literacy
tests was consistent with Lassiter; a Health and Human Serv-
ices policy that interpreted Section 1008 and allowed for abor-
tion referrals was consistent with Rankin and Arkansas
Writers'. In both, a federal action reversed the rule and con-
flicted with the settled doctrine: Section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act disallowed the literacy test, reversed the New York
statute and conflicted with Lassiter; the regulation in Rust dis-
allowed abortion referrals, reversed the agency's policy and
34. White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined the Chief Justice's majority
opinion. Blackmun, J., filed a dissent, in which Marshall, J., joined, and in which
Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ., joined in part. Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., filed separate
dissents.
35. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769-71.
36. Id. at 1771-78. The issues in Rust that involve abortion, privacy, women's
rights, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are beyond the scope of this Note.
37. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38. Id at 843. The Court's interpretation of Chevron holds the key to an
examination of Rust on the metatheoretical level. See discussion infra part II.A.
39. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
40. 481 U.S. 221 (1986). The First Amendment doctrine from Rankin and
Arkansas Writers' involves speech content-based restriction on the receipt of
government subsidies and government employment. See discussion infra part III.
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conflicted with Arkansas Writers' and Rankin. Finally, both
cases relied on explanations of relative institutional compe-
tence to uphold the rule in question.
II. DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
While perhaps not significant in themselves, the proce-
dural similarities between Rust and Morgan point to the
Court's underlying conception of its own function. Both deci-
sions refined the federal judiciary's role in reviewing the con-
stitutionality of rules made by another branch of the national
government based on the institutional competence of that
branch. These decisions, however, provided only a vague
description of the limits of the legislative branch's power. Sim-
ilarly, both cases appeared to invite a non-judicial institution to
enforce the constitutional provision that the Court declined to
enforce.
A. Chevron and Institutional Competence
In Morgan, the Court allowed Congress to use its "spe-
cially informed legislative competence"'" to define for itself
the Equal Protection Clause provisions that it is permitted to
enforce under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 This
part of the opinion, which occupies a single paragraph with
accompanying footnotes,43 inspired considerable controversy
among constitutional scholars." The question at the heart of
the controversy is whether Congress can enforce a constitu-
tional right that did not exist before Congress created it.
45
While Congress can exercise some discretion in deciding how
to use its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," modern jurisprudence places with the courts the role
of interpreting the provisions that Congress may enforce.47
41. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656.
42. See Choper, supra note 15, at 302-03.
43. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56.
44. In addition to the sources cited supra note 15 and infra notes 45, 46, and 48,
see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 253-60 (2d ed. 1991) and
authorities cited therein.
45. Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 827 (1984).
46. Sager, supra note 5, at 1230. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
empowers Congress to "enforce," but not to "interpret." Some may argue that a
distinction between these two functions is impossible to maintain. This argument is




Morgan, however, marked the first time that the Court
granted to Congress the dual role of interpreting and enforcing
constitutional provisions through legislation.48 Congress has
seldom attempted to use this power after Morgan,49 and a
majority of the Court never again relied on Morgan in this
context.5°
The Rust Court similarly deferred to the institutional com-
petence of a rulemaking body. To uphold the regulations
restricting employee speech, the Court had to find that the reg-
ulations were within the broad scope of Title X's authorization
of grants to family planning clinics. Both parties pointed to
language in Title X and to the legislative history to support
their interpretation of the statute.51 The Court decided that
Title X's language was ambiguous and did not speak directly to
the issues of counseling or referral.52
Under Chevron, when a statute is ambiguous and does not
speak to the issue at hand, "the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."5' 3 This permissible construction test
has subsequently been interpreted by the Court to require
adherence to traditional rules of statutory construction.5 This
interpretation was hinted at in Chevron.' However, the Chev-
48. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 605 (1975).
49. In 1981, a "Human Life Bill" that redefined the constitutional status of the
fetus was introduced in Congress. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 496
(1981). The proponents of this bill urged Congress to use its Morgan power to define
the "life" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The bill was rejected. See Carter,
supra note 45, at 823 n.17.
50. Carter, supra note 45, at 821. The Court came closest to allowing Congress to
use its Morgan power in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Court chose not
to, however, by a five-to-four margin.
51. The Department relied on H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1667, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1970), which states that "funds [shall] be used only to support preventive family
planning services." The doctors relied on S. REP. No. 1004, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1970), which states that Title X is "part of comprehensive health care, [which should
include] instruction, and referral to other services as needed." See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at
1768 n.3.
52. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767. Justice Stevens, dissenting, found that the statute
unambiguously supported the position of the doctors against the regulations. Id. at
1786-88. Because the Chevron judicial deference rule only applies when a statute is
ambiguous, Justice Stevens would have invalidated the regulations. Id.
53. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
54. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COL. L. REv. 2071, 2077-78 (1990).
55. "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
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ron Court did not clearly indicate which, if any, rules of statu-
tory construction are to be used in applying the permissible
construction test. The Chevron Court further confused the test
by stating that the administrative agency's interpretation need
only be "reasonable."' ' In a concurring opinion three years
later, Justice Scalia interpreted Chevron to require only a
determination that the regulation is reasonable, instead of
requiring the permissible construction test.57
In Rust, the Court considered at length the competence of
the Department of Health and Human Services to formulate
its own regulations.' The Court stated that under these cir-
cumstances, it must generally "defer to the expertise of the
agency."59 The Court then determined that the Department's
interpretation of the statute was a permissible construction.
60
Only after it determined that the regulation was a permissible
construction did the Court discuss the principle of statutory
construction that a statute must be construed so as to avoid
constitutional questions.61 This discussion seems odd coming
after the Court's holding that the agency's construction was
permissible. Two explanations for the Court's seemingly
inverted analysis of this rule of statutory construction are pos-
sible. First, the Court might have considered the constitutional
questions presented to be so meritless that the rule requiring
the avoidance of constitutional questions did not need to be
addressed, except as an afterthought. Second, the Court might
have intended to remove this rule of construction from the
Chevron permissible construction test, instead treating the rule
as a post hoc check on the agency's power.
6 2
The Chief Justice's language discredits the first explana-
tion.6 3 Additionally, it must be noted that two of the three fed-
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the
law and must be given effect." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 844.
57. Justice Scalia interprets the "permissible construction" language to require the
application of rules of statutory construction. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767-69.
59. Id. at 1768.
60. Id. at 1769.
61. Id, at 1771. See infra part II.B., which describes the Court's untimely
treatment of this rule of statutory construction.
62. Another possibility is that the order in which the Chief Justice addressed the
arguments is arbitrary and meaningless. This Note presumes otherwise.
63. "[W]e do not think that the constitutional arguments made by the petitioners
in this case are without some force .. " Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
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eral courts of appeals that addressed the regulation invalidated
it on constitutional grounds.64 To assert that the practice of
avoiding constitutional questions did not apply to this case, in
light of the results in the courts of appeals, would be "disingen-
uous at best."' Therefore, the possibility that the Court con-
sidered the constitutional questions raised in Rust to be
meritless does not sufficiently explain the omission of the con-
stitutional question rule from the majority's discussion of the
permissibility of the Department's construction of the statute.
Rather, the Rust Court omitted the constitutional ques-
tions rule from the Chevron permissible construction test.
Although Chevron did not explicitly address whether the exist-
ence of a constitutional question affects the permissible con-
struction test, subsequent case law has held that it does. For
example, the Court in DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Guf Coast
Building & Construction Trades Council6 6 addressed a
National Labor Relations Board regulation that prevented
members of a labor union from distributing handbills outside
of the members' place of employment. 7 The Court noted that
restricting the distribution of handbills raised First Amend-
ment freedom of speech questions." The Court then held that
the Chevron permissible construction test did not mandate def-
erence to an agency when the regulation violated the rule of
statutory construction that "where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems....
Thus, before Rust, under Chevron and DeBartolo, the fed-
eral courts were required to defer to an agency's interpretation
64. In addition to New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), cerL granted,
495 U.S. 956 (1990), and affirmed, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), see Massachusetts v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252
(1991); Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir.
1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
65. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In this statement, Justice
Blackmun assumed that the Chief Justice applied the rule of statutory construction.
However, Justice Blackmun also accuses the majority of "sidestep[ping] this
established standard of construction." Id. It is unclear whether he considered the
possibility that the rule was not applied at all.
66. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
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of the framework statute,7 ° but not to an agency's interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. In removing the constitutional ques-
tion rule from the Chevron analysis, Rust collapses the
DeBartolo rule into Chevron's permissible construction test.
The result is that the courts will defer both to an agency's
interpretation of the framework statute and to an agency's
interpretation of the Constitution.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca 71 supports this conclusion. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the major-
ity applied "ordinary canons of statutory construction" 72 to a
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals.73 Justice Scalia
stated that Chevron required courts to "give effect to a reason-
able agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpreta-
tion is inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional
intent," and that the application of canons of statutory con-
struction amounted to "an evisceration of Chevron."' 4
One canon states that a statute should be construed to
avoid constitutional questions. The majority opinion in Rust
mentioned this canon in the context of the Chevron permissi-
ble construction 'test.75 Had Justice Scalia felt that a rule of
statutory construction was actually being applied to the Chev-
ron permissible construction test, it is reasonable to believe
that he would have concurred, as he did in Cardoza-Fonseca,
and reiterated his preference against the application of rules of
statutory construction to the permissible construction analysis.
Justice Scalia, however, joined the majority in Rust. This indi-
cates that the constitutional questions rule was not included as
part of the permissible construction analysis.
If the Rust Court deferred to the Department of Health
and Human Services interpretation of the statute without con-
sidering the constitutional question, then the Court deferred to
the constitutional interpretation of the Department. One may
then wonder why the Court did not explicitly announce this
jurisprudential approach. Perhaps its proponents could not
assemble a majority behind such an openly nontraditional
approach. Nevertheless, this same deference to the constitu-
70. A framework statute grants, defines, and restricts an agency's power to
promulgate regulations.
71. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
72. Id. at 449.
73. 1d at 446-48.
74. I at 454.
75. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
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tional interpretation of an administrative agency was explicitly
suggested by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Webster v. Doe.76
Webster v. Doe involved the availability of judicial review
of an employee termination decision made by the Director of
Central Intelligence." Under Section 102(c) of the National
Security Act, the Director "may, in his discretion, terminate
[an] employee ... whenever he shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States...."7 The terminated employee brought suit, claiming
that the Director's action was arbitrary and capricious under
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),79 and
was violative of various constitutionally protected rights4 ° The
Court held that Section 102(c) precluded judicial review, under
the APA, of the Director's termination decisions, but held that
Section 102(c) did not preclude review of the employee's con-
stitutional claims.8'
In a spirited dissent, 2 Justice Scalia stated that the major-
ity's approach to the issue of the reviewability of the constitu-
tional claims fell "far short of explaining the full scope of the
areas from which the courts are excluded. ' 83 Justice Scalia
suggested that the Director's decision on the constitutional
issues was "beyond the range of judicial review,"84 and
denounced the presumption that "constitutional violations
must be remediable in the courts." 5 The Rust Court appears
to have implicitly adopted a similar deference to the constitu-
tional decisions of an administrative agency.86
Thus, as in Morgan, the Court in Rust deferred to the con-
stitutional interpretation of another branch of the federal gov-
76. 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1988).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
80. Webster, 486 U.S. at 596.
81. Id. at 603-04.
82. "[O]bsolete may be the assumption that we are capable of preserving a sensible
common law of judicial review." Id. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 608.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 612.
86. Rust can even be seen as an expansion of the deference that Justice Scalia
demonstrated in Webster, in that the statute in Rust that empowered the Director of
DSHS to promulgate regulations contained no clause limiting the availability of
judicial review, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-41 (1988), whereas the statute that empowered
the Director of the CIA to terminate employees contained the "whenever he shall
deem necessary" language, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1988).
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ernment. Morgan allowed Congress to interpret the equal
protection provisions that it is empowered to enforce. Simi-
larly, Rust allowed the Department of Health and Human
Services to interpret the statutes that it is empowered to
enforce.
This aspect of Morgan has been criticized as being con-
trary to the spirit of Marbury v. Madison,87 because it contra-
dicts Chief Justice Marshall's proclamation that "[ilt is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."" Even before Rust, Chevron itself had
been described by Professor Sunstein as "counter-Marbury."89
In extending Chevron to give deference to administrative regu-
lations that raise constitutional questions, the Court in Rust
brings to life Professor Sunstein's seemingly extreme charac-
terization. ° Thus, like Morgan, Rust alters the distribution of
national powers by transferring what was a judicial duty to one
of the political branches.
B. Limitations on the Judicial Deference Theories
Before Rust, the rules of statutory construction provided a
limit to the deference that was granted to agencies under the
Chevron permissible construction test.91 Rust does not indicate
what limits to this deference remain if such rules of construc-
tion are not applied. A similar question regarding the limita-
tion of judicial deference was presented in Morgan.
In his dissent in Morgan, Justice Harlan expressed his fear
about removing the constraints on deference that the rules of
construction provided.9' He noted that the interpretive role
that the majority had granted to Congress could be used not
87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
88. Id. at 177. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Cohen, supra note 48, at 606.
89. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2075.
90. Rust goes beyond even Sunstein's broad reading of Chevron. Rust was before
the Court when Sunstein wrote his article. Regarding the pending litigation, Sunstein
stated that:
Serious constitutional questions would be raised by a congressional effort to
prevent clinics from speaking to patients about the abortion alternative where
the text of the statute is ambiguous. In the absence of a clear legislative
statement, it should probably be interpreted so as to avoid the constitutional
question.
Id. at 2113 n.196.
91. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
92. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 16:833
Rust v. Sullivan
only to expand individual rights, but also to contract them.93
Justice Brennan responded to this assertion by stating that
"Section 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion
in the other direction...."" This one-way limit, the only limit
that the Morgan Court placed on Congress's interpretive
power, has been dubbed the "ratchet theory."95
The ratchet theory has been widely criticized because
there is no logically compelling reason why Congress's Section
5 power should work in only one direction, and the Morgan
Court does not explain why the expansion of rights should be
preferred to contraction." Furthermore, when multiple consti-
tutional rights compete, expansion of one right can cause con-
traction of another; therefore, it is not obvious in which
direction the ratchet is turning.' Thus, lacking logical support
and coherent standards, the limit that the Morgan Court
placed on its deference to Congress's rule-interpreting power
amounts to no limit at all, leaving Congress broad discretion in
the use of its new power to interpret the Constitution.
Similarly, the Rust Court does not provide a useful limit
on the deference it grants to the rulemaking power of adminis-
trative agencies. If an administrative regulation implicates
constitutional questions, then the permissible construction test
provides no constitutional limitation on the regulation because
the constitutional question rule is not part of the test.98 If the
constitutional questions rule is applied after the permissible
construction test, as it was in Rust,99 then this rule might serve
as a limit on the agency's discretion, and a meaningful and
workable limit to the agency's discretion might exist. Accord-
ingly, the Rust Court's treatment of the constitutional ques-
tions rule must be examined.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 651 n.10.
95. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 606; Carter, supra note 45, at 830-34 (describing
the ratchet theory as limiting the Morgan power). A ratchet is a mechanical device
that is designed so that the handle can be turned in one direction, but not in the other.
Most ratchets, however, have a switch that changes the direction in which the handle
can be turned.
96. Carter, supra note 45, at 830.
97. Sager, supra note 5, at 1231. Professor Sager provides the example of an
ordinance, designed to prevent block-busting, that forbids for-sale signs in a racially
integrated neighborhood. The right of members of the racial minority to live in
integrated neighborhoods would expand, while the right of home owners to advertise
the sale of their houses would contract.
98. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
99. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767-71.
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In Rust, the majority applied the standard from United
States v. Delaware and Hudson Co.100 and United States v. Jin
Fuey Moy.101 Those cases stated that "[a] statute must be con-
strued, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that
score."'" 2 Interestingly, the majority omitted the dates from its
citations for these two cases-1909 and 1915.103 The Court did
not mention that since those dates, the grave doubts standard
has been modified by cases such as International Association
of Machinists v. Street.'0
In Street, the Court stated that "federal statutes are to be
so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutional-
ity.' 0 5  Similarly, in United States v. Security Industrial
Bank,'06 the Court asked only "whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the constitutional question
may be avoided."' 0 7 Although the Court has not explained the
differences in these standards, the common meaning of these
words would indicate that "grave doubts" is the most stringent,
that "serious doubts" is less stringent, and that "fairly possi-
ble" is the least stringent.'
In Rust, the Court returned to the more stringent stan-
dard."° The Court stated that the regulations "do not raise the
sort of grave and doubtful constitutional questions" that would
require their invalidation."10 Because of the context of the reg-
ulation in question, its disharmony with existing First Amend-
100. 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
101. 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1915).
102. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771 (quoting in Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. at 401) (using
Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 408, for support) (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. 367 U.S. 740 (1960).
105. Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
106. 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., 6-3 decision).
107. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
108. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun seems to have missed this distinction: "The
majority does not dispute that 'federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid
serious doubt of their constitutionality.'" Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (emphasis added).
Later, he uses the "grave doubts" standard and the "fairly possible" standard,
apparently interchangeably. Id. at 1778, 1780.
109. Or, perhaps, the Court combined all three standards. Such a combination, as
applied in Rust, appears to have the same effect as the "grave doubts" standard.
110. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771 (internal quotations omitted). The Court may have
felt that it had to resurrect this standard for statutory interpretation, because the




ment doctrine,"' and the interpretations of the courts of
appeals," 2 the Court interpreted "grave doubts" to mean "not
beyond possible modification of existing doctrine.""13 Rust
appears to allow the Court to uphold a regulation that raises
constitutional questions whenever the Court can construe
existing doctrine to accommodate the regulation. Under this
approach, the Court's deference to constitutionally questiona-
ble regulations is limited only by the Court's ability to imagine
possible modification of existing doctrine. Such an infinitely
flexible standard amounts to no restriction at all. Thus, as in
Morgan, the Court in Rust placed no predictable limits on its
deference to the rule-interpreting discretion of another branch
of the federal government.
C. The Court's Role and the "Underenforcement" Thesis
When the Court defers to the constitutional interpretation
of another branch of government, it also relinquishes its power
to enforce the constitutional provision that it is no longer
interpreting. Professor Sager recognized this connection and
provided an explanation for the Morgan Court's deference to
the rule-interpreting discretion of Congress." 4 He noted that
the federal courts have two roles in constitutional adjudication.
First, the federal courts establish doctrine. Second, they
enforce constitutional protections."' Professor Sager main-
tains that although these two functions often overlap, certain
judicial decisions describe the limit of the court's role in
enforcing constitutional protections without delineating the
boundary of those protections. 16 In other words, such deci-
sions operate on a metatheoretical level, rather than on a theo-
retical level. Professor Sager notes that these metatheoretical
decisions have three characteristics. First, they appear to be
disharmonious with an existing constitutional doctrine. Sec-
ond, they base their holding on institutional competence. And
third, they contain other anomalies that result from the dispar-
ity between the limits of the protections and the limits of the
court's role in enforcement." 7
111. See infra part II.
112. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
113. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
114. See Sager, supra note 5.
115. Id. at 1213.
116. I& at 1218-19.
117. Id,
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The Rust decision exhibits all three of the characteristics
identified by Professor Sager. Rust represents a significant
departure from certain First Amendment doctrines."' The
Court relies on arguments of institutional competence to sup-
port this departure." 9 And an anomaly results from the
Court's denial that a constitutional question existed in Rust.
This anomaly is evidenced by the Court's strained interpreta-
tion of the "grave doubts" standard.120 Therefore, under Pro-
fessor Sager's analysis, the Rust Court did not make a decision
based on substantive constitutional interpretation, but decided
its role in enforcement. This distinction explains some of the
more startling aspects of Rust, but leaves unresolved the ques-
tion of who should enforce the underenforced constitutional
protections.
Whether the Rust Court based its decision on its interpre-
tive role or on its enforcement role, the regulation would have
been upheld. If the decision is seen as a statement on the
Court's enforcement role, however, Congress, the states, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the voting
public12' are alerted to the existence of an underenforced con-
stitutional protection. In other words, these institutions are
told that the theoretical limit of First Amendment protection
lies beyond the reach of the Supreme Court's enforcement
power, and they are put in a position to pass legislation or reg-
ulations that reinforce the First Amendment beyond the limit
of the Court's power.
This is, in fact, exactly what has happened. Not long after
Rust was decided, Congress began deliberation on a bill 22 that
would invalidate the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices speech regulations. 2 ' A majority of both chambers passed
this bill, but the House fell twelve votes short of overriding a
subsequent presidential veto.124 Congress's delay indicates that
it did not object to the Department's interpretation of the
framework statute, or to the Department's interpretation of
118. See infra part III.
119. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767-69.
120. See supra notes 100-113 and accompanying text.
121. Following the writing of this Note, President Bush failed in his bid to be
reelected to a second term, perhaps in part because the voting public sought to enforce
constitutional provisions left underenforced by the Court.
122. H.R. 2707, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
123. Adam Clyner, Bill to Let Clinics Discuss Abortion is Vetoed by Bush, N. Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at Al.
124. Id. at A12.
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the substantive constitutional doctrines at issue in Rust, Con-
gress could have objected to these interpretations in 1988 when
the regulation was passed. Instead, Congress attempted to fill
the enforcement void in the First Amendment, and perhaps
the Fifth Amendment, which was left by the Rust decision,
according to what it perceived to be the full dimensions of
those amendments.'2 Statements made by members of Con-
gress during deliberation on this bill support this theory;
months after the Court decided Rust, proponents of the bill
argued that the regulations infringe on First Amendment
protections.'1
A conflict occurred because those outside of Congress
interpreted Rust as a ruling on substantive First Amendment
law. For example, in a statement defending his veto, then
President Bush assumed that the Court found that the regula-
tion did not violate the First Amendment. 12 Thus, while a
majority of Congress attempted to compensate for the under-
enforcement of the First Amendment, the President believed
that the First Amendment was already fully enforced by the
Court to its substantive limit. Had the Court clarified its
enforcement role, 128 Congress and the President could have
focused the debate on whether First Amendment protection
should be enforced by the legislative branch, instead of arguing
over whether the regulations violated the First Amendment.
Professor Sager's analysis illuminates an important differ-
ence between Morgan and Rust: In Morgan, the Court allowed
Congress to fill an enforcement void that existed prior to the
Morgan decision; whereas in Rust, the Court created the First
Amendment enforcement void that Congress later tried to
fill.1" In this regard, the effect of the regulations in question
in Rust is more subtle than the effect of the statute at issue in
Morgan, because the effect is less obvious to the individuals
affected. 1
30
125. See Sager, supra note 5, at 1227.
126. "Abortion rights advocates, arguing that the counseling ban would infringe on
the First Amendment's freedom-of-speech protection for medical personnel, had hoped
to bring along enough traditionally anti-abortion votes in both houses to produce the
first successful veto override of the Bush presidency." 49 CONG. Q. 3456 (Nov. 23,
1991).
127. See Clyner, supra note 123.
128. Conversely, the Court could have clarified that it did not alter its
enforcement role, but, rather, that it altered First Amendment doctrine.
129. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
130. Only the Congressional action following Rust made the front pages.
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Another important difference exists between Rust and
Morgan. In Morgan, the Court deferred to the constitutional
interpretation of Congress, which remained constrained in its
interpretive capacity by the Presidential veto; whereas in Rust,
the Court deferred to the constitutional interpretation of an
administrative agency, which remains unaffected by the Presi-
dential veto. 131 For example, if Congress chose to use the Mor-
gan constitutional interpretation power, but the President
objected, Congress would need a two-thirds supermajority to
exercise this power. On the other hand, if an administrative
agency promulgated a regulation of questionable constitution-
ality, the agency would have interpreted the Constitution and
found the regulation to be constitutional. The Court would
then defer to the agency's interpretation. Thus, an agency's
interpretation under Rust would lack the supermajoritarian
constraint that Congress's interpretation would have under
Morgan.
The 1991 anti-Rust bill illustrates, another result of Rust
that sets it apart from Morgan. Administrative agencies exist
because Congress cannot manage every aspect of national pol-
icy. 32 Because of Congress's inability to micromanage, admin-
istrative framework statutes are often drafted broadly and
vaguely so that the agency has the flexibility necessary for
effective management. Such management includes the adop-
tion and implementation of specific regulations to effectuate
the statute.13 Broad or vague statutes, however, create the
opportunity for the President to direct the agency head, whom
the President probably appointed, to promulgate a regulation
that is contrary to Congress's unstated or unclear intent.
Under Rust, the courts will defer to that regulation, l"' even if
it raises constitutional questions. Congress must then clarify
the original statute by passing a new statute with enough votes
to override the inevitable Presidential veto. This cooperative
effort between the President and an administrative agency
allows the President to effectively veto an unclear provision in
131. The administrative agency also remains immune to a legislative veto under
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
132. E.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1981).
133. Id.
134. That is, the court will defer to the regulation if it passes the increasingly




an existing framework statute. The President need merely
direct the agency to create a regulation contrary to that provi-
sion, substitute his version, and frustrate the intent of the Con-
gress that passed the original statute.
In apparent recognition of the Rust majority's deference to
the constitutional interpretation of an administrative agency,
Justice Blackmun began his dissent as follows: "Casting aside
established theories of statutory construction and administra-
tive jurisprudence, the majority in these cases today unnecessa-
rily passes upon important questions of constitutional law."'"
One could argue, however, that the Rust Court did not pass on
any constitutional questions, but found the regulations to be
consistent with existing First Amendment jurisprudence. If
this argument succeeds, then the judicial deference to the con-
stitutional interpretation of an administrative agency that is
suggested by this Note is merely academic. Accordingly, the
Court's discussion on the First Amendment issues must be
addressed.
III. AVOIDANCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENT IN RUST
The Rust Court could have addressed the First Amend-
ment issues first. Had the Court done so and found the regula-
tions to be unconstitutional, it would have had no need to
address the Chevron statutory construction issue. The Court,
however, chose to address the metatheoretical Chevron issue
first.1" Only after deciding to defer to the constitutional inter-
pretation of the agency did the Court consider the petitioners'
First Amendment objections. 137 Thus, by addressing the
metatheoretical issue first, the Court predetermined the theo-
retical issues, rendering discussion of the First Amendment
issues unnecessary.
The Court did not, however, simply ignore the theoretical
First Amendment questions in Rust. Instead, the Court dis-
cussed the petitioners' objections and struggled to fit the regu-
lations into existing First Amendment doctrine. It did not
succeed.
The petitioners made two First Amendment objections.
First, they argued that although the government may place
conditions on receipt of subsidies, the regulations before the
135. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 1767.
137. Id. at 1771.
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Court impermissibly use subsidies as a means to regulate
speech content.'i 8 Second, they argued that although the gov-
ernment may place conditions on potential employees, the reg-
ulations impermissibly condition government employment on
relinquishment of First Amendment freedoms.139 Each of
these arguments are discussed in turn.
A. Spending Discretion or Speech Content Restriction?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed governments
to place conditions on the receipt of government subsidies.140
Yet, absent a compelling state interest, the Court has not
allowed these conditions to be based on speech content. 141 The
Court applied this rule in the following three cases: Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,'4 Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington,143 and Paciflc Gas & Electric
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California.144 In Rust,
the Court departed from this precedent.
In Arkansas Writers', the Court addressed an issue involv-
ing a state regulation that taxed magazines, but exempted reli-
gious, professional, trade, or sports periodicals.14  The Court
found this regulation to be "particularly repugnant to First
Amendment principles" because "a magazine's tax status
depends entirely on its content."'" The Court held that when
the government seeks to regulate speech content, it "must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.'
'1 47
In Regan, the Court examined the constitutionality of a
prohibition against the use of tax-deductible contributions to
support lobbying activities."4 This restriction was not content-
based. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist
138. Id
139. Id at 1774.
140. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
141. See. infra notes 142-155 and accompanying text.
142. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
143. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
144. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
145. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 223.
146. Id at 229; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364
(1984) (holding unconstitutional a section of the Public Broadcasting Act that
prohibited nonprofit educational stations that received grant money from engaging in
editorializing).
147. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 231.
148. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
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upheld the regulation, reasoning that it was not intended to
suppress any ideas, and did not have that effect.149 He did,
however, note that "[tjhe case would be different if Congress
were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way
as to aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas."'"
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co., the Court examined an order
from the California Public Utilities Commission that required
a privately owned utility company to include in its billing enve-
lopes printed matter with which the utility company dis-
agreed.'' The restriction was content-based.'52 The Court
noted the possibility that the utility company would "be
required to alter its own message as a consequence of the gov-
ernment's coercive action [and that this] is a proper object of
First Amendment solicitude.'1 5 3 Ultimately, the Court held
that because "the danger is one that arises from a content-
based grant[,. . . it is a danger that the government may not
impose absent a compelling interest."'" The Court confirmed
the notion that the First Amendment protects both "the pub-
lic's interest in receiving information" and "the speaker's inter-
est in self-expression.'
1 55
The type of unconstitutional regulation that the Court
warned of in Regan, and remedied in Arkansas Writers' and
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., involves two concurrent conditions:
first, that the government uses its discretion to allocate
resources; and second, that the government discriminates on
the basis of content. The Rust Court, however, modeled these
two conditions as mutually exclusive, as if in doing one, the
government could not possibly do the other: "[T]he Govern-
ment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
149. Id. at 548.
150. I& (internal quotations omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist's comment was
dicta. It reminds us that a regulation that grants or denies a tax exemption, as in
Arkansas Writers', or one that grants or denies a monopoly, as in Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., has the same effect as a regulation that grants or denies a direct subsidy, as in
Regan or Rust. In both cases, the government grants a monetary benefit to members
of one group at the exclusion of members of another.
151. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 4. As a corporation, the utility company
retains First Amendment speech rights. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
152. Paciftc Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 13.
153. 1o& at 16.
154. Id. at 16-17.
155. 1& at 8.
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other."'" The Court thus created a dichotomy which suggests
that any time the government uses its spending discretion, it
must not be violating a First Amendment guarantee.'57 This
dichotomy, however, does not alter the fact that the regulation
unquestionably turns on speech content and that content-based
regulations are scrutinized more highly.1s
Although faced with a content-based regulation, the Rust
Court did not address the issue of whether there existed a
compelling state interest. In this regard, Rust directly conflicts
with the Arkansas Writers' holding that the government may
not base decisions on how to apportion funds on compliance
with restrictions on speech content without showing a compel-
ling state interest." 9 Furthermore, the factual setting in Rust
is strikingly similar to that in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.6 °
Again, Pacifw Gas & Electric Co. involved an administrative
ruling that restricted the speech content of communication
from a private utility company to its client.'6 ' Similarly, Rust
involved an administrative regulation that restricted the
speech content of communication from private clinics to their
clients.'6 2 The utility company in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
had been granted a monopoly position by the government.
163
Similarly, the clinics in Rust had been granted subsidies by the
government." Both cases involved the public's interest in
receiving information as well as the speaker's interest in self-
expression. The Pacific Gas & Electric Co. Court required the
government to demonstrate a compelling state interest. 65 The
Rust Court, however, declined to follow this precedent and
required no showing of a compelling state interest.
To illustrate its new approach to content-based speech
restriction, the Rust Court provided a hypothetical example:
"A doctor who wished to offer prenatal care to a project
156. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772.
157. Or, perhaps, it must not be violating any other constitutional guarantee.
158. "The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion
of an entire topic." Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
159. Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 231.
160. Curiously, the dissenting opinions in Rust did not mention this case.
161. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 4.
162. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764.
163. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 22 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).
164. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764.
165. Pac fic Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16-17.
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patient who became pregnant could properly be prohibited
from doing so because such service is outside the scope of the
federally funded program .... The regulations prohibiting
abortion counseling and referral are of the same ilk.""' In
other words, rules that condition government subsidies on
speech content are no longer subject to greater scrutiny than
rules that create nonspeech conditions. Thus, the Rust Court,
"for the first time, [upheld] viewpoint-based suppression of
speech solely because it is imposed on those dependant upon
the Government for economic support."'
1 67
Again, two characterizations of the Rust Court's novel
treatment of content-based restrictions may be offered. First,
the Court handed down a theoretical decision and altered First
Amendment doctrine. Second, the Court handed down a
metatheoretical decision and decided that the First Amend-
ment decision was not for the Court to make. This second
explanation is supported by the Court's subsequent decision in
Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board'
Simon & Schuster demonstrated that the theoretical First
Amendment doctrine applied in Arkansas Writers' and Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. remained unchanged by the Rust decision. 69
In Simon & Schuster, the Court addressed the New York
"Son of Sam law." This law required that an entity that con-
tracts with a person who was accused or convicted of a crime
for the production of a book describing the crime must make
funds from that contract available to the victims of the crime
who obtain civil judgments against the criminal. 7 0 The Court
struck down the statute.'17  Relying on Leathers v. Medlock '
72
and Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,7 3 the Court
reasserted that "[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with
the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on
speakers because of the content of their speech,' 74 and that
when the government attempts to restrict speech content, it
"must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compel-
166. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772. Prohibiting the performance of prenatal care would,
of course, be a non-speech condition.
167. Id at 1778, 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991).
169. Id. at 509-10.
170. Id at 504.
171. Id. at 508.
172. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
173. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
174. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
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ling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.' 1 75 The Court recognized the difference between the tax-
ation regulation in Arkansas Writers' and the donation
requirement in Simon & Schuster, but stated that "this differ-
ence can hardly serve as the basis for disparate treatment
under the First Amendment.'
1 76
Similarly, the difference between the taxation regulation
in Arkansas Writers' and the subsidy regulation in Rust cannot
serve as the basis for disparate First Amendment treatment.
Thus, Simon & Schuster indicates that Rust did not alter the
presumption of unconstitutionality that accompanies a restric-
tion on speech content. Rust simply avoided the compelling
state interest test altogether.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions on Employment
After declining to apply the compelling state interest test
to a content-based restriction, the Rust majority addressed the
petitioners' argument that the regulations impermissibly condi-
tion government employment on the relinquishment of First
Amendment freedoms. The majority noted that the regulation
limited the freedom of expression of the clinic employees,
explaining that "this limitation is a consequence of their deci-
sion to accept employment" in the Title X project. 77 The rea-
soning employed in Rust presents a stark departure from
established doctrine that was applied in several previous cases,
including Rankin v. McPherson,'178 Elrod v. Burns,179 and Perry
v. Sindermann.'80 In all of these cases, a government entity
attempted to condition employment on compliance with a
restriction on First Amendment freedoms.
In Rankin, a deputy was fired after her boss, an elected
official, overheard her making a critical comment about Presi-
dent Reagan while at work.181 The Court held that "a State
may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that
employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of
175. Id. at 509.
176. Id. at 508.
177. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775.
178. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
179. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
180. 408 U.S. 593 (1971). For another example of the Court's refusal to allow
subsidies to be conditioned on performance in the workplace, see Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).




In Firod, an elected sheriff required employees who
wished to keep their jobs to pledge political allegiance to the
Democratic Party.18 3 The Court held that "[r]egardless of the
nature of the inducement, [including] denial of public employ-
ment, . . .no official ... can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
"1184
In Perry, a college refused to renew the contract of a pro-
fessor who publicly disagreed with the college's Board of
Regents."a The Court held that "even though a person has no
'right' to a valuable government benefit, [the government] may
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes on his
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
freedom of speech."' 8"
The Rust Court distinguishes the above cases using two
lines of reasoning. First, the Rust regulation merely prevents
employees from performing activities that they are not being
paid for;8 7 and second, the regulation restricts a program, not
a person."'8 The majority's first line of reasoning, however,
does not effectively distinguish Rust from Rankin. The deputy
in Rankin was paid for performing police work, not for making
political comments. Similarly, a clinic employee in Rust is paid
to counsel clients regarding family planning, not to counsel
regarding abortion. While it is true that the two cases differ in
that there was no official regulation against the speech in
Rankin, the result in that case would not have been different
if the deputy had been told, ex ante, that she could be fired for
saying certain things. The regulation at issue in Rust tells
employees in advance that they probably will be fired for say-
ing the "A" word, because if the clinic loses its funding, it
probably will not be able to pay the employee. The majority
admitted as much, stating that "this limitation is a consequence
182. Id. at 383 (citation omitted). For an explanation of why unconstitutional
conditions may not be placed on an employee under an at-will contract, see Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1, 6-14 (1988).
183. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355.
184. Id. at 356.
185. Perry, 408 U.S. at 595.
186. Id. at 597.
187. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
188. Id.
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of their decision to accept employment in the project....
The majority's second line of reasoning makes a formal
distinction between "program" and "person" that fails to con-
sider real world effects. The regulation restricts the "pro-
gram," which restricts the clinics, which then must choose
either to pass the restriction on to clinic employees or to give
up the funding. Thus, the result is exactly the same as if the
regulation directly restricted the employees, as did the govern-
ment in Elrod."9 Elrod probably would not have been decided
differently if the county had passed a regulation aimed only at
the law enforcement "program," mandating that it could not
hire non-Democrats. Moreover, the Rust majority blurs its
own distinction by labeling the regulation "a prohibition on a
project grantee or its employees."'191
Although the regulation prohibiting the mention of abor-
tion conflicts with previous First Amendment doctrine, Chief
Justice Rehnquist fails to criticize the previous rules and
writes as if the majority's decision is consistent with prece-
dent.192 One is compelled to consider the explanation that the
Court did not disagree with the holdings in Arkansas Writers'
and Rankin. It appears, instead, that the Court did not apply
precedent, deciding that it is not the role of the federal courts
to question the constitutional interpretation of an administra-
tive agency. The effects of this metatheoretical ruling could be
far-reaching.
IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF RUST
If Rust grants considerable discretion to administrative
agencies that promulgate regulations that conflict with consti-
tutional provisions, its holding may have far-reaching results.
Because the results would occur whether or not the majority
intended them, the majority's intent to further restrict the
right to abortion is not critical. Nevertheless, these intentions
are worth examining because of their possible political and
jurisprudential relevance.
189. Id at 1775.
190. Elrod, 427 U.S. 347.
191. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772.
192. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist states that: "There is no question but
that the statutory prohibition contained in § 1008 is constitutional." Id,
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A. Does Rust Merely Erode Roe v. Wade?
The members of the Rust majority are among the Justices
who have not concealed their contempt for Roe v. Wade.93
The decisions in Harris v. McRae'' 9and Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services 115 stand as examples of the decline of the
substantive Fifth Amendment right to privacy upon which Roe
stands. The decision in Rust can be seen as no more than an
attempt by the majority to manipulate existing doctrine to
achieve a result that it finds politically or morally desirable.
This explanation is suggested by Justice Blackmun, who
accused the majority of "disregard[ing] established principles
of law and contort[ing] this Court's decided cases to arrive at
its preordained result.""'
One could argue that, given the Court's general dissatisfac-
tion with Roe, any modification of the enforcement role of the
federal courts that appears to have occurred in Rust would
have only precedential value in other cases that implicate Roe.
According to this interpretation, the Court would not grant
broad discretion to administrative regulations that implicate
constitutional issues unless those regulations involve family
planning.'97 Even if the Court intended such a limited reading
of Rust, however, Justices applying this case in the future
might not share this limited intent. Furthermore, if the Court
is result-oriented, this decision will allow too much discretion,
because it is unlikely that family planning is the only issue for
which the Justices have political or moral agendae.
B Possible Applications of Rust Are Planted in Its Own
Dicta
To predict possible future interpretations of the Rust rule
of judicial deference, we need not look beyond Rust's dicta.
The Court appears to assure us that its holding would not
193. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating laws that criminalize abortion).
194. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a statute that denied Medicaid funding for
abortion).
195. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a state law restricting abortions).
196. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786, (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197. For recent examples of cases in which the Court has declined to apply
Chevron broadly in non-family planning cases, see Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n,
60 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1992) (striking down an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act by
the U.S. Attorney General, meant to remedy racial discrimination); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 60 U.S.L.W. 4145 (1992) (striking down a NLRB ruling aimed at preventing
employers from interfering with union picketing).
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apply to content-based restrictions of speech in a university
setting because "the Government's ability to control speech
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vague-
ness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment."'198
Such an assurance would not have been necessary before Rust
because the government could not condition subsidies on the
content of speech,"9 and because universities have been within
a traditionally protected sphere of free expression.2" The Rust
Court, however, declined to enforce both of those guarantees.
The Court allowed the Department of Health and Human
Services to base a subsidy on the content of clinic employees'
speech, and the Court allowed the Department to invade the
traditionally protected sphere of the doctor-patient
relationship.20 '
In place of these two guarantees, the Court offers the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. This dictum implies,
however, that the Court would not strike down a regulation
that places a content-based restriction on university employ-
ment or attendance if that regulation is neither vague nor
overbroad. These doctrines provide shrinking degrees of pro-
tection.0 2 Thus, the Rust Court may have paved the way for
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to condition
federal subsidies on adherence to regulations which prohibit
speech that the Department considers offensive, such as sci-
ence or literature courses that subscribe to or deny modern
evolutionary theory. Rust appears to allow both regulations so
long as they are neither vague nor overbroad. Thus, Rust's dic-
tum provides a possible application of its rule.
C. Other Possible Applications of Rust
A broad reading of Rust inspires one to imagine the outer
limit of constitutionally questionable administrative regula-
tions to which the Court would defer. Consider a Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (NRC) regulation that conditions an
employee's receipt of salary or pension on refraining from
speaking to anyone about a hazardous situation at a power
198. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
199. See supra notes 142-155 and accompanying text.
200. See Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1963).
201. A product of this sphere of protection is the physician/patient privilege.
202. See Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (holding that statute forbidding
the possession of certain kinds of nude photographs was not overbroad).
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plant. That the regulation restricts speech content should
bother no one after Rust. An employee's challenge to such a
regulation is likely to fail after Rust, because a reviewing court
would likely defer to both the NRC's First Amendment inter-
pretation as well as to the NRC's institutional rule-making
competence. Even the possible adverse effects on public health
of the regulation would probably not place it beyond the unde-
fined realm of a "permissible" construction. This hypothetical
regulation illuminates the potential problem inherent in Chev-
ron/Rust deference; namely, that an agency could promulgate
constitutionally questionable regulations designed to cover its
mistakes. Other self-serving agency regulations could be cre-
ated to prevent reduction of the agency's own budget or to pro-
long its own existence.
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could place
speech content-based restrictions on tax benefits. Suppose the
IRS promulgated a regulation that made a tax exemption for
dependent children 0 3 conditioned on the use of parental pow-
ers to teach that abortions are not appropriate. 204 This regula-
tion could result from the sort of intragovernmental collusion
that arguably motivated the regulation in Rust: The President
appoints the department head, who promulgates regulations
designed to further the President's political goals. The federal
courts would not consider such motivation in determining
whether the regulation is a "permissible" interpretation of the
framework statute. The Rust Court deferred to the agency's
constitutional interpretation, a matter arguably beyond the
agency's competence. Similarly, the courts could defer to the
hypothetical IRS regulation, even though the purpose of the
regulation is clearly beyond the Department's comparatively
superior competence.
V. CONCLUSION
On first reading Rust v. Sullivan, a student of constitu-
tional law senses that something is out of place. A closer read-
ing reveals that the Rust Court ignored First Amendment
precedent. An examination of the Chevron Court's permissible
construction analysis reveals that the Court performed this
203. 26 U.S.C. § 151(c)(1) (1991).
204. This hypothetical regulation was proposed by Professor John Mitchell, in
Don't Ever Discuss Rust v. Sullivan with a Lady in a Grocery Line, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 25, 37 (1992).
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test without applying the standard rule that requires statutes
to be construed so as to avoid constitutional questions. One is
compelled to consider the explanation that the Court did not
interpret the First Amendment at all, but rather, deferred to
the Department of Social and Health Services' interpretation.
In other words, Rust does not deal with theoretical First
Amendment issues, but rather deals with the metatheoretical
question of who is to decide those issues.
The Court similarly deferred to Congress's constitutional
interpretation in Katzenbach v. Morgan. Analysis of that case
illuminates the balance of power implications underlying Rust.
Although the controversial part of the Morgan decision fell
into disuse, Rust appears to have a bright future; the outlook of
the current Court should ensure continuing judicial deference
to the discretion of administrative agencies regarding constitu-
tional issues.
